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Background: The ability to interpret agents’ intent from their actions is a vital skill in successful social interaction.
However, individuals with autism spectrum disorders (ASD) have been found to have difficulty in attributing
intentions to others. The present study investigated the neural mechanisms of inferring intentions from actions in
individuals with ASD.
Methods: Functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) data were acquired from 21 high-functioning young
adults with ASD and 22 typically developing (TD) control participants, while making judgments about the means
(how an action is performed) and intention (why an action is performed) of a model’s actions.
Results: Across both groups of participants, the middle and superior temporal cortex, extending to temporoparietal
junction, and posterior cingulate cortex, responded significantly to inferring the intent of an action, while inferior
parietal lobule and occipital cortices were active for judgments about the means of an action. Participants with ASD
had significantly reduced activation in calcarine sulcus and significantly increased activation in left inferior frontal
gyrus, compared to TD peers, while attending to the intentions of actions. Also, ASD participants had weaker
functional connectivity between frontal and posterior temporal regions while processing intentions.
Conclusions: These results suggest that processing actions and intentions may not be mutually exclusive, with
reliance on mirroring and mentalizing mechanisms mediating action understanding. Overall, inferring information
about others’ actions involves activation of the mirror neuron system and theory-of-mind regions, and this activation
(and the synchrony between activated brain regions) appears altered in young adults with ASD.
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As social animals, human beings are often engaged in
watching and interpreting each other’s behavior, especially
the ‘how’, ‘what’, and ‘why’ of their actions [1]. A basic
understanding of the nature and means of an action helps
observers infer the intention of the agent involved.
Simulating others’ actions may prove critical in helping us
understand the meaning of such actions and emotions, as
suggested by earlier studies of the simulation theory of
mindreading [2-4]. However, more recently it has been
suggested that, at the neural level, the representation of
one’s own and others’ actions is mediated by the mirror* Correspondence: rkana@uab.edu
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unless otherwise stated.neuron system (MNS) through internal simulation and
replication of these actions [2,5-7]. First discovered in the
macaque monkey, mirror neurons are a set of specific
neurons that fire when the monkey executes a movement,
as well as when it observes the same movement
performed by someone else [8-12], creating a simulation
circuit that allows the association of one’s own actions
with the actions of others. Human neuroimaging studies
have pointed to the ventral premotor cortex, especially the
inferior frontal gyrus (IFG), along with the inferior parietal
lobule (IPL), as the core regions of mirror neuron activity
[6,7,9,13-15]. Nonetheless, questions remain about the
significance of the MNS and its putative involvement in
making social inferences. For example, how does one
understand the meaning and intent of others’ actions by
simulating it? Is simulation, mediated by MNS activity,Ltd. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative
ommons.org/licenses/by/4.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
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action intention?
It is assumed that the information about a simulated
action in the MNS is passed along to the core theory-of-
mind (ToM - the ability to attribute mental states to
others) regions for inferring an agent’s intention [16-18].
Areas found to be associated with ToM include the
medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC), the posterior cingulate
cortex (PCC), and the posterior superior temporal sulcus
(pSTS) at the temporoparietal junction (TPJ) [19-23]. Both
MNS and ToM networks are involved in understanding
actions and attributing intentions, however they appear to
be functionally and anatomically segregated, at least in
some ways. One meta-analysis of over 200 functional
magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) activation studies
showed that the MNS network (IPL and IFG) was related
to processing biological motion (moving body parts) and
ToM network (MPFC, PCC, and TPJ) to more abstract
processing of others’ intentions, in the absence of any
biological motion [24]. In addition, two cross-sectional
fMRI studies [18,25] specifically explored the how, what,
and why of others’ actions in typically developing (TD)
individuals. Both studies concluded that the MNS
(through the IFG aspect) is active during the visual
processing of others’ actions (how and what), and ToM
regions (MPFC, PCC, and pSTS) are additionally recruited
to process their intentions (why); thus it appears that
inferring others’ intentions from their actions may be the
result of two distinct functions (MNS and ToM networks).
While understanding the means of actions (how)
and attributing intentions to the agent (why) may be
an implicit and rather effortless task for TD individuals,
several behavioral studies have found that people with
autism spectrum disorders (ASD) have great difficulty in
doing so [26-29]. One early study [30] suggested that an
interruption in the ability to connect one’s own actions
with the actions of others results in impaired social
development and a deficit in ToM. Behavioral studies
have indicated that individuals with ASD have a marked
difficulty in connecting another’s actions to their own,
particularly due to impaired imitation skills, a behavioral
correlate of MNS [29,31-33]. Since the ability to imitate
may strongly rely on MNS activity [34-38], it is not
surprising that a dysfunction in the MNS has been
postulated as an underlying mechanism for imitation
deficits seen in ASD [29,39]. Studies have linked the
MNS with other aspects of social cognition, including
empathy, joint attention, self-recognition [29,36,40], and
ToM [41]. In addition, anatomical and functional alter-
ations of the MNS have been found to be related to social
impairment and symptom severity in ASD [29,39,42-46]
(for a review see [47]). Therefore, a dysfunctional MNS
may underlie the widespread social impairments seen in
ASD (see reviews by [48-50]).Despite the findings of dysfunctional MNS, other studies
have reported no differences in MNS activation in ASD
participants compared to TD individuals, raising questions
about a MNS dysfunction in ASD [51-53]. These critiques
allude to the possibility of different neurological processes
occurring at resting state in autism, triggering false
detection of hypoactivation in MNS [52], the possible
existence of multiple mirroring systems in autism
[54,55], and even methodological differences in fMRI
studies [56]. Even the proponents of the MNS dysfunction
hypothesis of ASD acknowledge that a deficit in the
MNS, although able to explain some social-cognitive
dysfunctions, as of yet does not explain other key
symptoms of ASD, such as repetitive behaviors and
restricted interests [39]. Therefore, the MNS hypoth-
esis of ASD is a topic of intense debate in the autism
literature.
The present study addresses several questions pertaining
to the MNS hypothesis, the involvement of MNS and ToM
networks in action understanding and mentalizing, and
how these networks may be functionally different in people
with ASD. Using a set of action intention stimuli adapted
from de Lange et al. [18], we predicted a significant
increase in MNS (IFG and IPL) response while attending to
the means (how) of an action, whereas increased
recruitment of ToM (MPFC, PCC, and TPJ) regions
when attending to the intent (why) behind an action
in TD individuals. Given the somewhat inconsistent
literature in MNS in ASD, but consistent findings of
abnormal ToM processing in ASD [57-59], we expect
abnormal recruitment of the ToM network while
attending to intentions, but rather typical MNS activation
while attending to the means of an action in ASD partici-
pants. Based on the disrupted connectivity accounts of
ASD [60-63], it is predicted that the ASD participants
will exhibit altered functional connectivity (synchronization
of brain activity) of the MNS and ToM networks dur-
ing this task. The current study is novel in its focus
on examining the differential involvement of MNS
and ToM networks and their functional connectivity
in autism. Findings from this study will provide new
insights into understanding the role of MNS and ToM
systems in action understanding and its potential
alterations in ASD.
Methods
Participants
Functional MRI data were collected from 26 high-
functioning young adults with ASD and 28 TD control
participants. Five ASD and 6 TD participants with excessive
head motion were excluded from the analysis. Groups
were matched on age, handedness, IQ, and head motion,
resulting in a final sample of 22 TD and 21 ASD partici-
pants (see Table 1). All participants were assessed on the
Table 1 Demographic information
Groups
TD (n =22) ASD (n =21) t value p value
Gender 17 M; 5 F 17 M; 4 F - -
Handedness 20 R, 1 L, 1 A 16 R, 2 L, 3 A - -
Age (years) 24.9 (±5.2; 19-36) 25.7 (±6.4; 17-40) 0.43 0.67
Verbal IQ 114.4 (±10.3; 92-141) 112.9 (±15.0; 80-139) 0.37 0.71
Performance IQ 116.5 (±9.5; 100-133) 106.3 (±12.4; 94-138) 0.05 0.96
Full-scale IQ 117.5 (±8.8; 105-140) 116.3 (±12.8; 91-140) 0.35 0.73
RAADS-R total 45.7 (±24.1; 13-112) 115.4 (±39.5; 32-181) 3.54 <0.001
Mind in the Eyes 21 (±2.3; 17-25) 19 (±3.5; 15-25) 2.25 0.03
EQ 47.5 (±10.3; 27-74) 31.5 (±13.3; 15-65) 3.54 <0.001
Values are presented as mean (standard deviation; range). The P value is independent t-tests for differences between groups. Abbreviations: TD typically
developing, ASD autism spectrum disorder, A ambidextrous, F female, L left, M male, R right, IQ intelligence quotient, RAADS-R Ritvo Autism Asperger Diagnostic
Scale-Revised, EQ Empathy Quotient. EQ scores missing for one ASD participant due to incomplete questionnaire. Mind in the Eyes scores missing for one TD
participant who did not complete the test.
Figure 1 Experimental stimuli depicting intentions, means,
ordinary, and unusual conditions.
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Edinburgh Handedness Inventory [65], Reading the
Mind in the Eyes Test ([66]), the Ritvo Autism Asperger
Diagnostic Scale-Revised (RAADS-R; [67]), and the
Empathy Quotient (EQ; [68]). All participants were
required to have a full-scale IQ of 80 or above (measured
by the WASI) to be included in this study. The participants
with ASD were recruited through service providers in
Alabama (the University of Alabama at Birmingham
(UAB) Civitan-Sparks Clinic, UA Autism Spectrum
Disorders Clinic, Glenwood Foundation, Mitchell’s
Place, and the Alabama Autism Society), and from a
roster of individuals who have participated in previous
studies from the Cognition, Brain, and Autism Lab at
UAB. Participants with ASD were included if they had a
diagnosis of ASD based on the Autism Diagnostic Interview
(ADI-R; [69]) and the Autism Diagnostic Observation
Schedule (ADOS; [70]). Diagnoses were verified through
patient records retrieved through each participant’s clin-
ician. Healthy controls were recruited through advertise-
ments placed in the Birmingham area, and through the
Introduction to Psychology course (PY 101) subject pool of
the UAB Department of Psychology. Participants were
excluded from the study if they reported any neurological
disorders, claustrophobia, a body mass index exceeding 34,
metal implants or a history of working with metal, kidney
disease, diabetes, hypertension, anemia, sickle cell disease,
or if they were taking psychotropic medications. Before
participating in the study, study procedures were fully
explained to all participants and informed consent for
all aspects of the study protocol was obtained for all
participants. All aspects of the study protocol and
consent form were approved by the ethics committee
of the UAB Institutional Review Board for Human Use
(Protocol #: F070824010, Assurance #: FWA00005960).Stimuli and experimental design
The stimuli, adapted from de Lange et al. [18] included
a series of static, color images of a model interacting
with various common household objects (see Figure 1).
The objects included were small, handheld items such as
a telephone, coffee cup, spoon, or camera. The stimuli
were presented in a blocked design format with two
tasks (determining intentions and judging the means of
actions) and a fixation condition that served as a baseline.
Each image, presented for four seconds during the
experiment, was unique, and presentations of the
blocks were randomized and counterbalanced across
participants. In the intention task, participants viewed
an image and determined whether the intention
behind the model’s action was ordinary or unusual
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In the means task, participants viewed an image and
determined whether the means (or the way in which
the action was carried out) of the model’s action was
ordinary or unusual. Brief instructions for the tasks
were presented at the beginning of each block, and
participants indicated their response (ordinary or
unusual) via button press. Each block consisted of
four pictures with an inter-stimulus interval of one
second. The experiment was comprised of 16 blocks,
with eight blocks for the intention task and eight
blocks for the means task. In total, 32 images per
condition were included, with a total of 64 images for
a complete run. Each block contained either ordinary
or unusual trials, but never ordinary and unusual, to
facilitate the comparison of these conditions in addition to
intention and means.
Each participant practiced the experiment on a laptop
computer before the scanning session. The practice
included a fixation trial, as well as several unique trials
(using images from the same stimuli set that were
not included in the fMRI trials) representative of the
intention and means conditions. While in the MRI
scanner, the software Inquisit 2 (Millisecond Software,
Seattle, United States) was used to visually present
the stimuli. Using a laptop computer and an LCD
projector, the stimuli were projected onto a screen
behind the participant’s head, which were viewed using a
mirror. The participants’ responses were recorded using
fiber optic buttons, with unusual corresponding to the
right index finger, and ordinary to the right middle finger.
The participant responses provided reaction time and
performance accuracy data. Behavioral data were
compared between groups using a two (group) × two
(condition) mixed analysis of variance (ANOVA).
MRI data acquisition
Imaging data were acquired using a 3 T Siemens Allegra
scanner (Siemens Medical Inc., Erlangen, Germany)
housed at the Civitan International Research Center, UAB.
Anatomical images were acquired using high resolution
T1-weighted scans using a 160-slice three-dimensional
magnetization-prepared rapid gradient-echo (MPRAGE)
volume scan (Repetition time [TR] = 200 ms; echo
time [TE] = 3.34 ms; flip angle = 12°; field of view
[FOV] = 25.6 cm; matrix size = 256 × 256; slice thick-
ness = 1 mm). Functional T2*-weighted images (T2*
is a time constant describing the exponential decay of
MRI signal) were obtained using a single-shot gradient-
recalled echo-planar pulse sequence (TR = 1000 ms,
TE = 30 ms, flip angle = 60°, FOV = 24 cm, matrix =
64 × 64. This sequence allowed rapid image acquisition
and covered most of the brain (17 5-mm thick slices with
a 1-mm gap in an oblique-axial orientation) in a singlecycle of scanning with an in-plane resolution of 3.75 ×
3.75 × 5 mm3. A TR of one second was used in order to
elicit better temporal resolution for the functional
connectivity analyses. Relatively thicker slices were
used to allow for higher signal-to-noise ratio.
Data preprocessing
Functional images were processed using a combination
of Analysis of Functional NeuroImages software (NIMH
Scientific and Statistical Computing Core, Bethesda,
MD, USA) (AFNI, [71]) and FMRI software library 5.0
(Analysis Group, FMRIB, Oxford, UK) (FSL, [72]).
Functional images were slice-time corrected, and correction
for head motion was performed by registering each
functional volume to the middle time point of the
scan. These images were then registered to the anatomical
images via FSL’s FMRIB’s Linear Image Registration
Tool (FLIRT) [73,74]. Both images were resampled
(3 mm isotropic) and standardized to the atlas space
of the MNI152 template via FSL’s nonlinear registration
tool (FNIRT) for group comparisons, and a global full
width at half maximum of 8 mm was applied.
fMRI activation analysis
Functional images were scaled to a mean of 100 and
whole-brain statistical analyses were performed on an
individual basis using a standard general linear model
approach via AFNI’s 3dDeconvolve function with ordinary
intention, ordinary means, unusual intention, and unusual
means trials as regressors of interest. Six rigid-body motion
parameters acquired from head motion correction were
treated as covariates. The following two orthogonal
contrasts were computed to assess average brain
response: intention (ordinary + unusual) versus means
(ordinary + unusual), and unusual (intention + means)
versus ordinary (intention +means). Areas of statistically
significant activation were determined using one- and two-
sample t-tests, and to correct for multiple comparisons,
10,000 Monte Carlo simulations were applied via AFNI’s
3dClustSim function to obtain a corrected significance level
of P <0.05.
We further examined the relationship between fMRI
blood-oxygen-level dependent (BOLD) activation driven
by the tasks with neuropsychological assessment data by
conducting exploratory correlational analysis between beta
coefficients from the contrast intention versus means with
EQ and RAADS-R total scores. The regions of interest
(ROI) for this analysis were defined on the group
activation map for the pooled sample (TD +ASD) using
the contrast intention versus means, (peak positive and
negative t-values) so that it best represents the ROIs for
both conditions. A total of 12 ROI’s relevant to these
tasks were identified. For intention: left and right middle
frontal gyrus (LMFG and RMFG), left and right superior
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parietal junction (LTPJ and RTPJ), and posterior cingulate
cortex (PCC). For means: middle cingulate (MCIN), left
and right inferior parietal lobule (LIPL and RIPL), and left
and right extrastriate body area (LEBA and REBA). Seeds
were created using spherical binary masks (8-mm and
12-mm radius) that best captured the cluster of activation
and were trimmed from white matter. Parameter estimates
were then extracted from this contrast on an individual
basis on each group. We assessed brain-behavior relation-
ships separately for the TD, and ASD groups, and for both
groups combined.
Functional connectivity analysis
First, to account for signal from cerebral white matter and
lateral ventricles, masks were created at the participant level
using FSL’s FMRIB’s Automated Segmentation Tool (FAST)
automated segmentation [75]. Masks were trimmed to
avoid partial-volume effects, and an average time series for
each region was extracted. Derivatives for motion parame-
ters, white matter, and ventricular time series were com-
puted. Following spatial smoothing, sources of noise (head
motion, white matter, and lateral ventricles plus derivatives)
were modeled and removed using a general linear model,
and residual time series were used in subsequent functional
connectivity analysis. These steps characterize this analysis
as co-activation functional connectivity MRI (fcMRI) and
since there is no low-pass filtering or task regression, this
analysis retains task-driven effects [76]. Then, residual
time series were segmented into the two experimental
conditions of interest (intention and means) in order to
assess connectivity between the tasks. The ROIs for this
analysis were the same as the ones described in the earlier
paragraph. Residual time series were extracted for each
seed, and correlation coefficients were calculated across
the residual time courses from other ROIs. Correlation
coefficients were z-transformed using an inverse hyper-
bolic tangent function, followed by direct comparison of
the z-transformed correlations between the TD and ASD
groups using two-sample t-tests. Given the large number
of comparisons, increasing the likelihood of type I error, a
follow-up connectivity network analysis was performed by
grouping the ROIs into networks based on their anatom-
ical locations in the brain. Four networks were created for
this analysis: frontal (LMFG and RMFG), temporal (LTPJ,
RTPJ, LSTS, and RSTS), posterior (LIPL, RIPL, LEBA, and
REBA), and medial (PCC and MCIN), and statistical
analyses were performed using the same procedure as
described above.
Head motion correction
Because head motion can impact functional connectivity
analyses [77,78], the following precautions were taken.
Head motion was quantified as the Euclidean distancecalculated from the six rigid-body motion parameters
for two consecutive time points. Any instance under
0.5 mm was considered to be excessive motion, and the
time point as well as the immediately preceding and
subsequent time points were censored, or scrubbed [79].
If two censored time points occurred within 10 time
points of each other, all time points between them were
also censored. All participants retained 80% of time
points after censoring. Average head motion over each
participant’s session was defined as the root mean square
of displacement and did not significantly differ between
groups (t(41) = −1.49, P = 0.14). For more detailed analysis
of head motion, a two-way ANOVA was conducted to test
the effects of group (TD and ASD) and type of motion
(three translational and three rotational). The interaction
of group and motion type was not significant (F-value
(F)(5, 276) = 1.11, P = 0.41).
Results
Overview
The main results of this study are as follows: 1) processing
intentions activated middle and superior temporal cortex
along with PCC and precuneus (part of the ToM network)
in both TD and ASD groups, whereas processing means
activated IPL (part of the MNS network) and occipital
areas; 2) processing both ordinary and unusual actions
showed strong activation in both groups in frontal, middle
temporal, and parietal areas; 3) group differences involved
significantly reduced activation in ASD, relative to TD, in
calcarine sulcus extending to PCC during intention, and
increased activation in the ASD group in LIFG while
processing means of an action; 4) the ASD group showed
increased activation in pre- and postcentral gyrus, RIFG,
and LIPL with no inverse effects found (TD >ASD) during
unusual actions; 5) weaker functional connectivity was
found in the ASD group between frontal and posterior
temporal regions while processing action intentions; 6)
brain-behavior correlations were also seen in terms of
empathizing ability (positive) and autism symptom severity
(negative) related to activation in PCC; and 7) a significant
difference in performance accuracy, but not in reaction
time, was also found between ASD and TD groups.
Behavioral data
To assess possible group differences in performance
accuracy and reaction time (RT) measured during the
fMRI task, we conducted a two Group (ASD versus
TD) × two condition (means versus intentions) mixed
ANOVA. Group was treated as a between-subject factor
and intention and means as within-subject variables. There
was a significant main effect of group in performance
accuracy (ASD means trials: mean (M) = 83%, standard
deviation (SD) = 12%; ASD intention trials: M = 84%,
SD = 12%; TD means trials: M = 92%, SD = 9%;
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P = 0.03). However, there was no significant main effect
of condition (F(2, 41) = 0.61, P = 0.44), and no significant
interaction between group and condition for accuracy
(F(2, 41) = 1.56, P = 0.22). For reaction time, there was no
significant main effect of group (ASD means trials: M =
1,903 ms, SD = 504; ASD intention trials: M = 1,791 ms,
SD = 431; TD means trials: M = 1702 ms, SD = 436; TD
intention trials: M = 1684 ms, SD = 572), F(2, 41) = 0.99,
P = 0.33). There was also no significant main effect of
condition (F(2, 41) = 1.98, P = 0.17), nor was there a
significant interaction between group and condition
for reaction time (F(2, 41) = 1.05, P = 0.31).
Brain activation
Within-group results
We hypothesized the involvement of MNS and ToM
networks in this task of action understanding, with
differential roles in detecting the means and intention.
Processing intention in contrast to means revealed robust
patterns of activation in both groups in regions associated
with ToM, including middle and superior temporal cortex
extending to TPJ, and PCC. The means of executing an
action, on the other hand, showed significant activation
in bilateral IPL, and left middle/inferior occipital areas
(see Figure 2A, B and Table 2). Thus, while detecting
intentions recruited regions associated with the ToM
network, processing means evoked activation in MNS
areas like IPL. In addition, in the contrast unusual versusFigure 2 Within-group results for A) typically developing (TD) and B)
between-group differences for the contrast intention versus means. Warm
for within-group results; P <0.05, corrected.ordinary, activation was detected in the bilateral IPL,
bilateral extrastriate body area (EBA), left IFG, and left
supplementary motor area (SMA) for both groups;
whereas, ordinary actions (relative to unusual actions)
showed activation in postcentral gyrus and calcarine sulcus
in both groups (all significant clusters at P <0.05, corrected;
see Figure 3A, B and Table 3). There were two significant
correlations between activation (for the contrast intention
versus means) in the PCC with EQ, and RAADS-R total in
the pooled sample (TD +ASD). The relationship between
PCC and EQ was positive (correlation coefficient (r) = 0.33,
P = 0.02), whereas a negative relationship was found with
the RAADS-R total (r = −0.35, P = 0.01). However, these
results should be interpreted with caution due to two
reasons: no significant correlations were found when the
groups were examined separately, and these correlations
did not survive correction for multiple comparisons.
Between-group comparison results
Between-group comparison analyses for each of the
contrasts revealed significant differences between the
TD and ASD groups. For the intention versus means con-
trast, the TD group showed increased activation in the right
calcarine sulcus (extending to the PCC), whereas the ASD
group showed increased activation in the left IFG. In the
unusual versus ordinary contrast, the ASD group showed
increased activation in middle orbital gyrus, pre- and post-
central gyrus, and right IPL. No inverse effects (TD >ASD)
were found on this contrast (Figures 2C and 3C). Thus theautism spectrum disorder (ASD) groups, and C) significant
colors represent intention >means and cool colors means > intention
Table 2 Areas of peak activation for intention versus means and means versus intention contrasts
Volume Peak coordinates Peak
Contrast and group Region Hemisphere (number of voxels) X Y Z t
Intention versus means
TD Precuneus Left 1,063 −6 −63 33 7.4
Middle temporal gyrus Right 616 39 −51 3 6.8
Middle temporal gyrus Left 482 −60 −63 18 5.9
ASD Middle occipital gyrus Left 1,056 −36 −72 36 5.2
Posterior cingulate cortex Left 649 −6 −51 30 5.1
Superior temporal gyrus Right 605 54 −45 21 5.1
Middle frontal gyrus Left 501 −30 3 51 5.2
Inferior frontal gyrus Right 102 57 21 6 3.1
Middle frontal gyrus Right 100 36 15 48 3.5
Means versus intention
TD Middle occipital gyrus Left 1,564 −33 −87 −3 −5.3
Supramarginal gyrus Left 334 −51 −30 33 −4.0
Thalamus Left 143 −24 −27 −3 −4.7
ASD Cerebellar vermis Left 334 3 −57 −9 −3.8
Inferior occipital gyrus Left 253 −27 −78 −6 −4.6
Angular gyrus Right 127 30 −60 48 −4.6
Rectal gyrus Left 108 0 33 −24 −3.3
Group differences
TD > ASD Calcarine gyrus Right 355 6 −66 15 3.8
ASD > TD Inferior frontal gyrus Left 178 −48 33 15 −3.4
Abbreviations: TD typically developing, ASD autism spectrum disorder.
Figure 3 Within-group results for A) typically developing (TD) and B) autism spectrum disorder (ASD) groups, and C) significant
between-group differences for the contrast unusual versus ordinary. Warm colors represent Unusual > Ordinary and cool colors
Ordinary > Unusual; P <0.05, corrected.
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Table 3 Areas of peak activation for unusual versus ordinary and ordinary versus unusual contrasts
Volume Peak coordinates Peak
Contrast and group Region Hemisphere (number of voxels) X Y Z t
Unusual versus ordinary
TD Inferior parietal lobule Left 2,110 −45 −45 42 9.0
Superior occipital gyrus Right 1,239 30 −75 18 7.0
Precentral gyrus Left 1,015 −45 3 18 5.7
Angular gyrus Right 385 27 −63 45 7.3
Caudate Left 284 −9 9 6 4.5
ASD Inferior temporal gyrus Left 2,608 −45 −60 −6 6.7
Postcentral gyrus Left 2,525 −51 −3 39 6.3
Middle occipital gyrus Right 1,912 36 −75 12 5.9
Inferior frontal gyrus Right 801 33 30 −6 5.3
Ordinary versus unusual
TD Calcarine gyrus Right 1,416 3 −60 12 −6.2
Postcentral gyrus Left 391 −45 −21 48 −5.2
Middle temporal gyrus Left 303 −45 −39 0 −5.1
Angular gyrus Right 216 45 −69 36 −4.1
Superior frontal gyrus Right 197 24 63 9 −4.0
Middle frontal gyrus Right 168 27 24 36 −5.7
Superior temporal gyrus Right 159 39 −27 0 −4.6
Middle frontal gyrus Left 137 −30 30 33 −4.0
ASD Calcarine gyrus Right 1,855 12 −78 15 −5.3
Thalamus Right 405 6 −27 12 −4.6
Postcentral gyrus Right 175 39 −27 51 −5.2
Group differences
ASD > TD Middle orbital gyrus Right 273 48 54 −9 −4.0
Precentral gyrus Right 258 51 9 42 −4.9
Postcentral gyrus Left 246 −39 −30 60 −4.5
Inferior parietal lobule Right 154 45 −48 54 −4.2
Abbreviations: TD typically developing, ASD autism spectrum disorder.
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areas involved in action understanding; IFG and IPL for
processing intention and unusual actions respectively.
Functional connectivity
When connectivity among pairs of ROIs were examined,
the TD group showed increased functional connectivity
(r = 0.64) compared to the ASD group (r = 0.53) between
RSTS/RTPJ and right superior/middle frontal gyrus in the
intention condition (t(41) = 2.12, P = 0.04, uncorrected).
However, this effect did not survive multiple comparisons
correction. Nevertheless, a follow-up connectivity network
analysis revealed a statistically significant difference
(corrected using the Holm-Bonferroni method) between
groups, with the ASD group showing reduced frontal-
temporal functional connectivity, relative to TD controls,
during intention (t(41) = 2.90, P = 0.006, corrected)(see Figure 4). No significant group differences in
connectivity were detected while processing the means of
actions.
Discussion
By asking participants to judge the nature of intentions and
means (unusual or ordinary) of a model’s actions, this study
targeted two important neural networks mediating action
understanding, the MNS and the ToM, in autism. It has
been a topic of debate in the field of social neuroscience as
to whether these two networks are mutually exclusive
[80,81] or functionally coordinated [2,82,83] in the context
of processing action intentions. In our study, both groups
showed increased activation in middle/superior temporal
cortex and PCC/precuneus, while processing intentions of
actions relative to processing means of actions; regions that
are considered part of the ToM network. Processing means,
Figure 4 Functional connectivity results. A) Surface rendering showing frontal-temporal connections (regions of interest (ROIs) do not
represent actual size) that revealed reduced functional connectivity in the autism spectrum disorder (ASD) group. B) Mean functional connectivity
(Z’) in the frontal-temporal network for each group for intention and means conditions. Participants with ASD showed significantly reduced
functional connectivity (P <0.01, corrected) relative to typically developing (TD) control participants in the intention condition, but not in the
means condition. Error bars represent standard error of the mean.
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parietal (part of the MNS network) and occipital
areas. Neurons in the IPL have been found to be critical in
coding the organization of motor acts and in understanding
observed actions [84,85]. The pattern of activation seen
within each group in our study suggests the use of menta-
lizing and mirroring mechanisms in inferring intentions
and means of actions respectively. Nevertheless, it should
be noted that processing intentions, relative to means, also
elicited more activity in the frontal areas (MFG and IFG) in
the ASD group.
This pattern was also seen in the between-group analysis,
where the ASD group showed significantly more activity,
relative to TD, in left IFG for processing intention. On the
other hand, the ASD group showed reduced activity, for
the same contrast, in the right calcarine sulcus extending to
PCC. Thus, the ASD participants showed reduced activity
in a core ToM network area and increased activity in a core
MNS area, albeit in the left hemisphere. The left IFG peak
activation was found in Brodmann area (BA) 45 and
it is possible that the ASD participants depicted actionintentions as pragmatic representations (the parameters
that are relevant to the motor commands when executing
and observing an action), which were strongly associated
with the visual cue [86]. A recent meta-analysis of studies
of action understanding found that bilateral BA44 and
BA45 differed in activity, with the former more involved
action imitation and the latter in action observation [87].
While IFG activation is attributed to MNS usually in the
right hemisphere, there are several studies showing the
role of LIFG in action understanding. For example, using
a repetition suppression paradigm, Pobric and Hamilton
showed that LIFG is necessary in making perceptual
judgment about people’s actions [88]. BA45, especially
in the left hemisphere, has also been associated with
language production, and this increased activation may
underlie communication disorders experienced by people
with autism [89]. Another possible explanation is that our
stimuli for identifying intentions may have targeted
motor intentions, rather than abstract intentions, and
ASD individuals may have processed this at the motor
level with increased recruitment of the left IFG. Therefore,
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intent behind actions, might have relied on perceptual,
motoric, and linguistic representations of actions more, as
evidenced by the increased LIFG activation. It should
also be noted that the TD participants in our study
activated BA47, which encodes more abstract semantic
representations of an action; however, this cluster did
not survive multiple comparisons correction. The
ASD participants did not activate this region using the
same uncorrected threshold.
Most of the findings in this study are consistent with
that of de Lange et al. [18], from where the current
stimuli are adapted. Specifically, the TD group’s activation
in PCC and middle temporal gyrus extending to bilateral
TPJ while attending to intentions, as well as activation in
bilateral occipital areas while attending to means, are
consistent with this study. However, unlike the de Lange
study we did not find MPFC activation at the same
corrected statistical threshold at which we report other
results. The MPFC has been linked primarily to self-other
reflections. In the current study, the participants may have
refrained from self-reflection or abstract thinking as
the intentions of the model were common and evident at
the motor level [90-93]. In our study, the inference about
intentions may emerge from determining the model’s goal
when holding a spoon (to eat) or a cup (to drink). Whereas
the original study by de Lange et al. included images where
both the how and why of an action could be unusual, our
study only included unusual trials where one aspect of the
action was unusual and the other was ordinary, thus
making the current task relatively easier for participants.
This could be another reason for the absence of MPFC
activation in our task.
Previous studies have reported that prior experience, vis-
ual or motor, with an action can help in predicting the
means and intentions behind that action [94-96]. Thus, the
cortical mechanisms mediating a familiar action may be
different from that of an unfamiliar action. In the current
study, we also tested how MNS and ToM networks
responded to unusual and ordinary actions and how it dif-
fered in ASD individuals. Judging unusual actions, when
compared to ordinary actions, showed activation pri-
marily in the MNS (bilateral IPL, SMA, and IFG)
along with occipital regions extending to EBA in both
groups. These findings are consistent with previous
studies that have also reported activation in some of these
regions when viewing irrational actions versus rational
actions [97,98]. In addition, occipital activation during
unusual actions correspond to other studies where strong
EBA response has been previously reported during inco-
herent actions [99]. The increased left IFG activation in
the ASD group while judging means, and increased activ-
ity in the ventral premotor and IPL during unusual actions
in the current study is consistent with a previous reportof such an increase [46], where participants also activated
MNS network during a particular task.
Reduced functional connectivity of the frontal/posterior
temporal network in the ASD group while judging inten-
tions may suggest a more isolated and less coordinated
way of processing information in individuals with ASD.
This weaker connectivity in ASD is in line with previous
studies in adults with ASD reporting significant disruptions
in frontal to posterior connectivity [58,60-62]. The TD
control participants here may be effectively engaging and
coordinating frontal and temporal regions in processing
actions at multiple levels (perceptual, motor, goal-oriented
or intentional), ultimately inferring the intention behind
actions. Such communication may not be the norm in
information processing in ASD participants. While
STS/TPJ and IFG belong to seemingly different, anatomic-
ally segregated networks (ToM and MNS respectively),
their functional communication may be important in
understanding actions at richer and more comprehensive
levels. While ASD participants understand the intentions
behind these actions more accurately, it is possible that
their neural and cognitive route may differ from TD
control participants, and may not be processing intentions
at the same level as the TD control participants. It should
also be noted that a group difference in connectivity was
absent while processing the means of actions (r = 0.57 and
0.49 for TD and ASD, respectively). Efficient crosstalk
between frontal and temporal regions in TD participants
may underlie flexible modulation of functions (mirroring
and mentalizing), which may be absent in ASD. Thus, the
atypical connectivity between these two networks may be
modulated by the different tasks in our study: intention,
which primarily targeted ToM activity, and means, which
primarily targeted MNS activity. Such a pattern has also
been observed in resting-state fcMRI studies, where
intrinsic BOLD signal fluctuations (as opposed to the
task-driven effects in our study) are assessed [100].
Examining effective connectivity may provide more
information about the transfer of information between
these networks and provide more insights into the
functional dynamics of this communication.
An exploratory correlational analysis revealed two
significant relationships between PCC activation (intention
versus means) with RAADS-R and EQ scores for all partic-
ipants (ASD and TD groups combined). While these two
relationships are significant, their effect size may not reveal
a strong correlational effect. Nevertheless, these results are
meaningful in that the activation in PCC decreased with an
increase in symptom severity, and the activation in
PCC increased with the ability to empathize. Finally, at
the behavioral level, although a significant difference in
accuracy for processing means and intentions was found
when comparing the ASD young adults to their TD peers,
all participants performed well above chance on the task,
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very high (over 80% for each condition and group).
Conclusions
In summary, we found differential activation in the TD
group while processing intention and means, whereas
this effect was less prominent in the ASD group. The
participants with ASD showed robust MNS activity in
IFG and IPL while coding intention and means of this
action-understanding task. Some of these regions showed
significantly increased activity in ASD participants when
compared to their TD peers. Despite significant activation,
ASD participants showed weaker connectivity, relative to
TD controls, between frontal and temporoparietal areas
while processing intention. Overall, these findings suggest a
complex pattern of MNS and ToM response in individuals
with ASD, with mostly intact MNS response accompanied
by altered ToM activation and connectivity. Future studies
should further examine the anatomical and functional roles
of these systems in different aspects of action understanding
and social cognition in autism.
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